Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

A restaurant group based in Orange County provided catering services to a client and his family during the Masters golf tournament in Georgia. The parties discussed a menu for seven days but did not sign a written contract or discuss the cost beforehand. The restaurant group ended up providing meals and services for five days, serving around 25 guests per meal. After the event, the group sent an invoice for nearly $75,000, which the client disputed and refused to pay, leading to an increase in the invoice amount. The client maintained that he had been overcharged and would have made other arrangements had he known the cost.The Superior Court of Orange County heard the breach of contract case. During discovery, the client denied a request for admission that he had contracted with the restaurant group for seven days of service. At trial, the jury found in favor of the restaurant group but awarded a lesser amount than invoiced. After the verdict, the restaurant group sought cost-of-proof attorney’s fees under California Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.420 for the client’s denial of the request for admission, as well as court reporter costs. The trial court awarded only a small portion of the requested attorney’s fees, explaining that the restaurant group had not properly identified which fees related specifically to proving contract formation. The court also struck the entire amount claimed for court reporter costs, finding the group had not provided sufficient proof that the costs were recoverable.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, affirmed both the fee and costs orders. The court held that the restaurant group was entitled to some cost-of-proof fees because the client denied a request for admission that was later proved true, but the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding only a limited amount due to the group’s failure to segregate relevant fees. The court also upheld the denial of court reporter costs for lack of supporting documentation. View "Hanna Carroll Restaurant Group LLC v. Hagestad" on Justia Law

The plaintiff worked for a telecommunications company, first as a contractor and later as an employee. His primary responsibilities involved designing, developing, and documenting the company's interactive voice response (IVR) system, an automated system that routes customer calls. He led projects integrating and updating this system and served as the main point of contact for related IT services. Over time, his workload increased significantly, leading him to work long hours. After unsuccessful attempts to resolve concerns about his workload, he resigned.After his employment ended, the plaintiff sued the company in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, claiming violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) for unpaid overtime and breach of contract for not being paid $75 per hour for all hours worked. The company argued he was exempt from FLSA overtime requirements as a computer employee and that no valid contract for hourly pay existed. The district court granted summary judgment to the company, finding him exempt under the FLSA's computer employee exemption and concluding no contract existed.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The appellate court found that the plaintiff’s primary duties involved the design, development, and documentation of the IVR system, meeting the statutory criteria for the computer employee exemption under the FLSA, regardless of his lack of formal computer science education. The court also agreed with the lower court that the offer letter did not constitute a contract and that the subsequent at-will employment relationship did not create enforceable terms for hourly pay beyond forty hours. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Bennink v. Cincinnati Bell Tel. Co. LLC" on Justia Law

The appellants entered into a contract with the appellee for the construction of a house in Franklin County, Pennsylvania, and paid a $10,000 deposit. After terminating the contract in October 2015, the appellants expected the return of their deposit, but the appellee retained it. On April 10, 2017, the appellants filed a complaint in magisterial district court (MDJ court) seeking the return of the deposit. The MDJ court entered judgment in their favor, awarding the deposit amount plus costs.The appellee then timely appealed to the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, which required the appellants to file a new complaint within twenty days. The appellants failed to do so, and the case became dormant until July 2020, when, in response to a notice of intent to terminate, the appellants filed a common pleas court complaint including a conversion claim. The appellee asserted that this claim was barred by the statute of limitations. At trial, the jury found in favor of the appellants on conversion and determined the claim accrued on October 15, 2015. However, the trial court granted a directed verdict for the appellee, holding the complaint was not timely filed within the two-year statute of limitations. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed, holding that the filing of an MDJ complaint tolls the statute of limitations only during the pendency of the MDJ case and that the statute begins to run again after the expiration of the twenty-day period to file a complaint in the Court of Common Pleas.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the Superior Court’s holding. It held that the filing of an MDJ complaint tolls the statute of limitations for any cause of action based on the factual averments in that complaint, including during any appeal, and that the subsequent filing of a common pleas court complaint is a continuation of the original action, not the commencement of a new one. The appellants’ claim was thus not time barred. View "Whittington v. Daniels" on Justia Law

The dispute arose between two neighboring homeowners in a Tucson subdivision governed by a homeowners’ association and subject to recorded covenants, conditions, and restrictions (CC&Rs). The plaintiff alleged that noise and vibrations from the defendants’ newly installed air conditioning unit constituted a nuisance in violation of an anti-nuisance provision within the CC&Rs and sought both injunctive relief and damages. The CC&Rs also included a fee-shifting provision entitling the prevailing party in enforcement proceedings to recover attorney fees and costs.The Superior Court in Pima County held a bench trial and ruled in favor of the defendants, finding that while the noise was annoying, it did not rise to the level of an actionable nuisance or a violation of the CC&Rs. The court also concluded that the plaintiff did not prove any breach of contract or obligation by the defendants. Although the court recognized the CC&Rs as creating contractual relationships, it denied the defendants’ request for attorney fees, reasoning that the plaintiff’s claim was essentially a tort claim for nuisance, not a contract claim. The Court of Appeals, Division Two, affirmed, relying on the view that the anti-nuisance provision in the CC&Rs merely mirrored existing tort duties and did not independently support a contractual fee award.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona reviewed the case and held that an anti-nuisance covenant in recorded CC&Rs constitutes a contractual obligation that can be enforced between homeowners, even if the conduct also constitutes a tort. The Court further held that the fee-shifting provision applies to actions enforcing such covenants. The Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals’ opinion, reversed the Superior Court’s denial of attorney fees to the defendants, and remanded for determination of reasonable attorney fees. View "BURKETT v DRYJA" on Justia Law

A couple agreed to sell their ten-acre property, including a cabin and all personal property on site, to another couple for a total of $450,000. The buyers drafted two separate documents: one for the real estate ($350,000) and one for the personal property ($100,000). Both parties signed these documents. After closing and transfer of the real property, the buyers paid the $350,000 for the real estate but did not pay the $100,000 for the personal property. Upon taking possession, the buyers discovered some personal property items missing, some of which were later found to have been taken by a relative of the sellers. The sellers sued for breach of contract to recover the $100,000 for the personal property.The District Court of the Second Judicial District of Idaho conducted a bench trial and found in favor of the sellers. The court found the sellers had substantially complied with their obligations, determined the missing items were not a material breach, and awarded the sellers $96,538 (offsetting the value of missing items), plus attorney fees under Idaho Code section 12-120(3). The buyers moved for reconsideration, arguing that the obligation to pay for the personal property was extinguished by the doctrine of merger at closing. The district court denied the motion, holding the promise to pay for the personal property was collateral and survived closing. The court later granted attorney fees upon reconsideration.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed the district court’s decisions. The Court held that the promise to pay for personal property was collateral to the real estate deed and intended by the parties to survive closing, so the merger doctrine did not apply. The Court also held that Idaho Code section 12-120(3) independently authorizes attorney fees for actions on a “bill” or bill of sale, not just for commercial transactions. The sellers were awarded attorney fees and costs on appeal. View "Armitage v. DeGroot" on Justia Law

A married couple executed a Marital and Property Settlement Agreement (MPSA) in 2012, which allocated their marital debts, including a Parent PLUS student loan, to the husband. He agreed to be solely responsible for the debt and indemnify his former wife. While he resolved other debts, he did not pay the Parent PLUS loan until the wife sought contempt in 2022. The parties then stipulated that the husband would make monthly loan payments and apply proceeds from a business sale toward the loan. The wife remained the borrower, but the husband assumed responsibility for payments. After further nonpayment, the wife again sought contempt in 2024.The Montana Eleventh Judicial District Court, Flathead County, held the husband in contempt for failing to pay monthly amounts due in August and September 2024, denied his request for expanded account access, entered an immediately collectible judgment for the entire unpaid loan balance in favor of the wife, and awarded her attorney fees. The court determined that the husband had willfully failed to comply with his payment obligation and found that his unauthorized changes to the account justified restricted access.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the denial of unrestricted account access and the contempt determination based on August and September 2024 nonpayments. It also affirmed the award of $3,237.50 in attorney fees to the wife. However, the Supreme Court vacated the full-balance judgment for the loan, holding that the parties’ agreements did not authorize immediate acceleration of the entire debt based on missed monthly payments. The Court remanded for determination of an enforcement remedy consistent with the agreements and applicable law, and for reasonable appellate attorney fees, while denying appellate sanctions. The underlying allocation of debt and adjudicated obligations from June 2024 remain undisturbed. View "In re Marriage of Kearns" on Justia Law

Ashley Energy, an energy company in Missouri, experienced flooding at its plant and leased a boiler and water treatment trailer from Indeck Power Equipment to maintain operations. The lease required Indeck to provide a “like-new” boiler and new trailer, and Ashley to operate and maintain the equipment according to industry standards, specifically ABMA guidelines, and pay for repairs beyond ordinary wear and tear. After the boiler was returned, Indeck discovered scale and debris, attempted to clean it, and ultimately sued Ashley, alleging breach of contract and seeking over $3 million in damages. Ashley had previously sued Indeck in Missouri state court, but that case was dismissed due to a forum selection clause.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois conducted a jury trial. The jury found that Indeck had performed its contractual obligations and that Ashley had breached the contract. However, the jury concluded that Indeck failed to prove it had sustained damages as a result of Ashley’s breach, finding insufficient evidence that Ashley’s actions directly caused damage beyond normal wear and tear. Indeck’s post-trial motions for a new trial and for attorneys’ and experts’ fees were denied, with the district court explaining that the verdict could be rationally explained by evidence that Indeck’s own actions or equipment contributed to any damage or that no damage beyond ordinary wear and tear occurred.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the jury’s verdict was not irreconcilably inconsistent and was supported by plausible explanations from the record, and that Indeck was not entitled to attorneys’ fees as a non-prevailing party under the lease’s provisions. View "Indeck Power Equipment Co. v Ashley Energy LLC" on Justia Law

GateOne Gillette, LLC entered into a 20-year lease with the Northeast Wyoming Regional Airport Board to serve as the fixed base operator at the Campbell County airport, providing services such as flight instruction and aircraft maintenance. The Board was responsible for maintaining certain airport facilities and for shared maintenance of the fuel farm. In March 2025, the Board issued a notice terminating GateOne’s lease, asserting breach of contract, and subsequently took over GateOne’s operations and solicited its employees.GateOne filed a lawsuit against the Board in the District Court of Campbell County, seeking declaratory relief, damages for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and unjust enrichment. The Board moved to dismiss the suit under Rule 12(b)(6), asserting that it was immune from suit under both the terms of the lease and the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act (WGCA). The district court denied the Board’s motion, finding that the lease was ambiguous regarding the preservation of governmental immunity and could reasonably be read in more than one way. The Board appealed that denial.The Supreme Court of Wyoming first determined that the order denying the motion to dismiss based on governmental immunity was immediately appealable because immunity under the WGCA constitutes immunity from suit, not merely a defense to liability. On review, the Supreme Court held that the lease was ambiguous as to whether it preserved the Board’s immunity from contract claims, noting conflicting provisions and the need to consider extrinsic evidence. The Court affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss and remanded for further proceedings to resolve the ambiguity using extrinsic evidence, as necessary. View "Northeast Wyoming Regional Airport Board v. GateOne Gillette, LLC" on Justia Law

A taxpayer challenged a California school district’s use of a “lease-leaseback” arrangement with a contractor for constructing a new middle school. The plaintiff alleged the $36 million construction contract violated California’s competitive bidding statutes and conflict of interest laws. The district had selected the contractor from a prequalified pool and entered into preconstruction agreements, then executed lease-leaseback contracts for the project. The project was funded entirely by the proceeds of bonds approved by local voters, not by contractor-provided financing.Previously, the Superior Court of Fresno County dismissed the complaint, but on the first appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, held that the plaintiff had stated claims for both competitive bidding and conflict of interest violations. After further proceedings and another appeal, the California Supreme Court confirmed that the validation statutes did not bar the action, and the case proceeded to a bench trial. The trial court found the lease-leaseback arrangement qualified for the statutory exception to competitive bidding and rejected the conflict of interest claim, concluding the contractor was not an “officer” or “employee” for purposes of the conflict of interest statute.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, held that the conflict of interest claim was properly rejected because the contractor did not act as an officer or employee of the district. However, the court concluded that the competitive bidding exception did not apply because the project was financed by public bonds, not by the contractor. The court held that the proper remedy under Education Code section 17406(d)—enacted after the initial appeal—was to require the contractor to disgorge its net profit ($236,129), not the full contract amount. The judgment was reversed in part, and the trial court was directed to enter judgment requiring the contractor to refund its profit to the district. View "Davis v. Fresno Unified School Dist." on Justia Law

Whitney Oil and Gas, which operates oil and gas production platforms off the Louisiana coast, entered into a Master Service Agreement (MSA) with Quality Process Services (QPS) in 2016. Under the MSA, QPS provided contract laborers, primarily production operators, who routinely used vessels to reach Whitney’s platforms where they performed maintenance and monitoring tasks. In 2021, after Hurricane Ida, a Whitney employee was injured while being transported on a Whitney vessel operated by a QPS employee. The injured employee sued both companies in Louisiana state court, prompting Whitney to file a federal limitation action, with QPS seeking indemnity from Whitney under the MSA for injuries to Whitney’s employees.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana held a bench trial. The court found that the MSA was not a maritime contract because the parties did not expect vessels to play a substantial role in the completion of the contract beyond transporting workers. It concluded that under Louisiana law, the indemnity provision was unenforceable and dismissed QPS’s indemnity claim with prejudice. The court also ruled that Whitney was entitled to attorney fees under the MSA’s prevailing-party provision but deferred setting the amount until after any appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the district court’s judgment that the MSA was not a maritime contract, emphasizing that the parties’ expectations were that vessels served only as transportation and did not directly aid the performance of the contracted work. As a result, Louisiana law applied, and the indemnity provision was voided. The Fifth Circuit also dismissed without prejudice QPS’s appeal of the attorney-fee ruling, since the amount had not yet been determined. View "Quality Proc Svc v. Whitney Oil" on Justia Law